Improving security of a chaotic encryption approach by Li, SJ et al.
Improving Security of a Chaotic Encryption
Approach
Shujun Li ∗, Xuanqin Mou and Yuanlong Cai
Institute of Image Processing, School of Electronics and Information Engineering,
Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710049, P. R. China
Abstract
E. Alvarez et al. presented a new chaotic encryption approach recently. But soon
G. Alvarez et al. broke it with four cryptanalytic methods and found some other
weaknesses. In this letter we point out why the original scheme is so vulnerable to
the proposed four attacks. The chief reasons are two essential defects existing in the
original scheme. Based on such a fact, we present an improved encryption scheme
to obtain higher security. The cryptographic properties of the improved scheme are
studied theoretically and experimentally in detail.
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1 Introduction
E. Alvarez et al. presented a new cryptosystem based on the iteration of a
chaotic system [1]. It is a symmetric block cipher and encrypts every plain-
block into a 3-tuple cipher-block. Different from other conventional block
ciphers, its block size is variable. Based on a d-dimensional chaotic system
xn+1 = f(xn, xn−1, · · · , xn−d+1), the encryption and decryption procedure can
be depicted as follows. Firstly, select the control parameter of the system as
the secret key, and an integer bmax as the maximal block size of plaintext. For
one plain-block, whose size is bi = bmax, choose a threshold Ui to generate a
bit chain Ci from the chaotic orbit {xn} according to such a rule: xn ≤ Ui → 0
and xn > Ui → 1. Find the position at which the plain-block appears in Ci and
record (Ui, bi,Xi) as the cipher-block corresponding to the plain-block, where
Xi = (xi, xi−1, · · · , xi−d+1) is the state of the chaotic map at the position. If
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the plain-block cannot be found in a large enough catalog Ci, bi = bi − 1 and
the search is restarted. The tent map is used to demonstrate the performance
of such a chaotic cipher.
However, only some months later after the proposal of this cipher, G. Al-
varez et al. pointed out that it is very easy to be broken when the tent map
is used [2]. In their paper, they presented four kinds of attacks, which are
chosen-ciphertext attack, chosen-plaintext attack, known-plaintext attack and
ciphertext-only attack. They also pointed out some other weaknesses of the
chaotic encryption system. As the result, the authors claimed that the new
chaotic cipher is not secure at all, even if other chaotic systems are used instead
of the tent map.
In this letter, we study why the new chaotic cipher is vulnerable to so many
attacks, and propose a solution to improve its security. We find that two
essential cryptographic defects existing in the original scheme, which make the
four attacks available. If the two defects are avoided, the four attacks proposed
in [2] will be unfeasible, and the chaotic cryptosystem will be stronger from
the cryptographic viewpoint. Our proposed encryption scheme is based on the
above fact. Further theoretical and experimental analyses show that the new
encryption system has prefect cryptographic properties, so it also can resist
some potential attacks in the future.
2 Two essential defects and other weaknesses
2.1 The occurrence of Xi in ciphertext
The first essential defect lies in the occurrence ofXi in ciphertext. Considering
the dynamics of the employed chaotic system relies not only on the secret key
(control parameter) but also on the initial conditions, an eavesdropper may
obtain some useful information from Xi to lessen attack complexity of the
encryption system.
Actually, there does exist information leaking in the chaotic encryption system,
which is not less than E(1/bi), where E(x) represents the mean value of x. Ap-
parently, bi ≤ bmax → E(1/bi) ≥ 1/bmax. Given one cipher-block (Ui, bi,Xi),
let us consider how the bi bits of the plain-block Pi = Pi,0Pi,1 · · ·Pi,bi−1 is deci-
phered from it. Since the legal users know the secret key (control parameter),
they can calculate the bi iterating values {xi+j}bi−1j=0 from Xi. Then the plain-
block Pi can be obtained from {xi+j} and the threshold Ui as follows:
for j = 0 to bi − 1 do
if xi+j ≤ Ui then Pi,j = 0
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else Pi,j = 1
end
Obviously, b0 can be obtained from Xi just by comparing the two values xi
and Ui, without the secret key. Therefore, an illegal user can obtain b0 in
each plain-block under ciphertext-only attack. That is to say, at least 1/bi
information of the plain-block leaks from the cipher-block. As a whole, the in-
formation leaking will be not less than E(1/bi) ≥ 1/bmax. Generally speaking,
bmax cannot be too large, or the encryption speed will be rather slow. Then
the information leaking is relatively large to make the cryptosystem insecure
in many serious applications.
Furthermore, if one knows the approximate value (r′) of the secret key, he can
guess the plain-block by the symbolic dynamics of the chaotic system from
the initial condition Xi. The closer the secret key is to r
′, the better such a
guess works. This fact means that the encryption system is not sensitive to
secret key, which is undesired for a good cryptosystem [3]. The authors of [2]
employed such a fact to develop a ciphertext-only attack when r′ = 2. It is
found that such a guess can conceal the plain-block with high possibility when
the secret key is close to 2. Of course, the success ratio will decrease as the
right key departs from 2, but bear in mind that the information leaking of
this chaotic cryptosystem will not be less than 1/bmax for all available keys.
In addition, the chosen-ciphertext attack described in [2] is also based on the
fact that Xi in ciphertext can expose some useful information about the secret
key. By choosing Xi sufficiently close to zero and observing the corresponding
plaintext, one can get the secret key in a small number of steps.
2.2 Different dynamics with different keys
For the tent map used in [1], the dynamics with different secret keys (control
parameters) is much different, such as different visited interval of the orbit,
different Lyapunov exponent, different Kolmogrov entropy and the occurrence
of periodic window at many control parameters [4]. Since such difference can
be extracted from Xi, it can be used to develop some available attacks. It is
the second essential defect.
The different visited interval of the orbit with different key is easily used to
realize chosen-plaintext attack and known-plaintext attack as described in [2].
When control parameter is r, the visited interval will be [r(1− r/2), r/2]. By
the statistics of enough ciphertexts one can get the approximate lower (upper)
bound of the visited interval, then obtain the secret key r approximately. As
we have mentioned above, the chaotic encryption system is not sensitive to the
secret key, so the approximate secret key is enough to decrypt the ciphertext
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with high success possibility. Of course, one can find the exact value of the
secret key by searching it in a small neighbor area of the approximate value,
which will need much less computation complexity than searching it in the
whole key space.
Since Xi must be known to make such statistics, the known-plaintext attack
and chosen-plaintext attack in [2] depend on the both defects. Hence, if the
first defect is avoided, all the four attacks in [2] are infeasible. But in order
to avoid other possible attacks in the future, both defects should be mended.
We will do so in the improved scheme.
2.3 Other weaknesses
There are also some other weaknesses pointed out in [2]. They are the use of too
low computing precision, the lack of exact directions about how to choose the
initial condition and the secret key, and the non-sensitivity of ciphertext to the
secret key. The last weakness has been discussed in the last two subsections.
Others are not crucial for the original encryption scheme, and can be solved
by carefully re-consider the realization of original scheme.
Besides the above weaknesses, there still exists another serious problem in the
original scheme, which is about the slow encryption speed. It is obvious that
the encryption speed is chiefly determined by the search for the occurrence
of plain-block in Ci. Assume Ci is balanced on {0, 1}, then the probability of
the occurrence of every plain-block is 1/2bi , so the search procedure can be
regarded as Bernoulli experiments with probability p = 1/2bi . The number of
experiments satisfies geometric distribution, and its mathematical expectation
is 2bi [5]. If Ci is not balanced, the average number of experiments will be larger
than 2bi . Because bi cannot be very small to avoid the brute-force attack, the
encryption speed will be much slower as compared with other conventional
ciphers. On the other hand, bi will not be too large since the search will be
restarted with bi = bi − 1 if the plain-block cannot be found for a long time.
Such a paradox will make the selection of bmax very difficult to obtain both
considerable security and encryption speed. In [1], bmax = 16 is adopted, which
makes the chaotic cipher insecure and the encryption speed relatively slow.
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3 The improved scheme
3.1 Description
An improved scheme is proposed in this letter. It can avoid the two existent
defects and other weaknesses of the original one, and has higher security.
Without loss of generality, we employ a one-dimensional chaotic map to con-
struct the new cryptosystem. Assume a chaotic map defined on the interval
I = [a, b] is given: xn+1 = f(xn, p), where p is the control parameter. The fol-
lowing requirement should be satisfied: the chaotic map is ergodic on I with
unique invariant density function [6]. This requirement is needed to avoid the
second essential defect, and can make the statistical cryptanalysis impossible.
We can give some examples of such chaotic maps. It has been known that the
piecewise linear chaotic maps are ergodic and have uniform invariant density
function on their definition intervals [7]. Moreover, the piecewise linear maps
are the simplest kind of chaotic maps in practice (only several additions and
one division are needed). So they are the best candidates for our scheme.
Among them the simplest one can be denoted by eq. (1), which is similar to
but essentially different from the tent map used in [1]:
F (x, p) =
 x/p , x ∈ [0, p)(1− x)/(1− p), x ∈ [p, 1] , (1)
Another example is the chaotic map used in [8], which is also rather simple
and a little more complex than the map above:
F (x, p) =

x/p, x ∈ [0, p)
(x− p)/(1
2
− p), x ∈ [p, 1
2
]
F (1− x, p), x ∈ [1
2
, 1]
, (2)
Based on such a chaotic map, the improved scheme can be described as follows.
• The secret key : K = (x0, p), where x0 is the initial condition of the chaotic
map.
• The input – plaintext : P1P2 · · ·Pi · · ·, where the size of Pi is bi ≤ bmax.
• The encryption procedure is quite similar to the original scheme. For the
first plain-block P1 whose size is b1 = bmax, run the chaotic map from x0,
and select a threshold U1 to generate a bit chain C1 as the same rule in the
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original scheme. Find the position at which P1 appears in C1, and record
(U1, b1, n1) as the cipher-block, where n1 is the number of iterations of the
chaotic map from x0. If P1 cannot be found in a large enough catalog C1,
b1 = b1 − 1 and the search restarts. For the second and the following plain-
blocks, the encryption procedure is just like above, except that the chaotic
map runs from the position after the last plain-block is encrypted, not x0.
• The output – ciphertext : (U1, b1, n1) (U2, b2, n2) · · · (Ui, bi, ni) · · ·. In fact, the
threshold Ui can be fixed for all plain-blocks, then the ciphertext will be
simplified to (b1, n1)(b2, n2) · · · (bi, ni) · · ·. Generally speaking, the threshold
should be selected to make Ci balanced on {0, 1}, i.e., P{Ci = 0} = P{Ci =
1}. It can be derived from the invariant density function of the chaotic
map. For the two chaotic maps above-mentioned, the threshold is 0.5, the
midpoint of I = [0, 1].
• For the legal users knowing the secret key, the decryption procedure is easy
to be realized by re-generating Ci for each cipher-block.
We can see the both defects in original scheme are avoided in the above scheme.
What’s more, different from the original scheme, the improved one is a stream
cipher, not a block cipher. Such a fact means that smaller bmax can be used and
the paradox between the security and the encryption speed will be overcome
to some extent.
3.2 Discussion
In our scheme, one important problem should be considered carefully, since it
can cause weak keys in the whole key space of the chaotic cryptosystem. It
is about the statistical degradation of the digital chaotic map. In the recent
years, many researchers have found: when chaotic systems are discretely real-
ized in finite precision, some serious problems will arise, such as short cycle
length, non-ideal distribution and correlation functions [9–16]. Among these
problems, short cycle length is very crucial. When the finite computing preci-
sion is L(bits), the cycle length of the chaotic orbit will be much smaller than
2L for many control parameters and initial conditions. What’s worse, there
are many control parameters and initial conditions making the chaotic orbit
converge on fixed value after some iterations. For the chaotic map defined by
(1), an extreme example is as follows: assume p = 1/2, for each x0, both the
chaotic orbit and Ci will lead to zero after L iterations. Such a fact will make
the encryption procedure stop, and make the encryption system infeasible.
Apparently, we must remedy this problem in our scheme. While in fact, there is
yet not an established theory to measure the statistical properties of discrete-
time chaotic maps and direct how to improve them. Only several engineering
methods are proposed to escape from such a problem: using higher finite preci-
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sion [10,11], perturbation-based algorithm by pseudo-random number [12,13],
and cascading multiple chaotic systems [15]. In our scheme, the perturbation-
based algorithm proposed in [13] is suggested, which can be briefly depicted
as follows.
Use a PRNG (Pseudo-Random Number Generator) to generate a signal to
perturb the orbit of the chaotic map at regular intervals. Assume the cycle
length of the sequence generated by the PRNG is T and the perturbing interval
is ∆, the cycle length of the perturbed chaotic orbit will be σ · ∆ · T , where
σ is a positive integer. Generally, the maximal length LFSR (Linear Feedback
Shift Register [3]) is used as the perturbing PRNG, when its degree equals
to the finite computing precision L, the cycle length of the perturbed chaotic
orbit will be σ ·∆ · (2L− 1) > 2L. Such a long length can improve the discrete
ergodicity of the chaotic map in the finite precision. For the piecewise linear
chaotic maps, it hints the uniform distribution of the chaotic orbit in the
discrete space, which is desired for a good cipher.
As argued in [13], the amplitude of the perturbing signal should be much
smaller than the one of chaotic signal. But our experiments show that: the
larger the perturbing signal is, the better the results coincide with the theo-
retical analyses and the faster the encryption system runs. It is because the
chaotic orbit will be more uniformly with larger perturbing signal. So we sug-
gest using larger perturbing signal instead of smaller one, then the perturbed
chaotic system can be considered as a compound system of nonlinear dynam-
ics and pseudo-randomness of the perturbing PRNG. Here, the nonlinearity of
the chaotic systems ensures the security and the PRNG mends the degraded
digital statistical properties of discrete chaotic systems.
3.3 Cryptographic properties
In this section, we give the following statement firstly. Since bi in ciphertext
just indicates the block size of the corresponding plain-block, we will only
regard ni as the “real” ciphertext.
As we know, two chief cryptographic properties of a good cipher are confusion
and diffusion, which are commonly ensured by the balance and avalanche
properties of the ciphertext in conventional cryptography [3]. But our chaotic
cipher has rather different property: the ciphertext is not balanced, since the
larger ni, the smaller the possibility of its occurrence in the ciphertext. Assume
Ci is a balanced i.i.d. bit sequence, the search procedure can be considered as
Bernoulli experiments with probability 1/2bi ; then we can deduce the discrete
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distribution of ni:
P{ni = k} = 1
2bi
·
(
1− 1
2bi
)k−1
, (3)
which is independent and identical for different secret keys and plaintexts
theoretically.
Actually, there are four corresponding facts on the distribution of the cipher-
text: 1) for different plaintexts, the ciphertext has the same distribution func-
tion; 2) for different secret keys (control parameters and initial conditions),
the ciphertext has the same distribution function; 3) for two plaintexts even
with only one bit difference, the ciphertext is rather different; 4) for two secret
keys even with only one bit difference, the ciphertext is rather different. The
first two facts denote confusion, and the other two denote diffusion.
Because our improved scheme avoids the two essential defects, and satisfies
the confusion and diffusion properties, we can use smaller bmax compared to
the original scheme. Thus the encryption speed will be faster. However, since
the time-consuming search procedure is still used, the encryption speed is
still slower than most conventional ciphers. Assume the speed of iterating
the chaotic map is s iterations per second; the average encryption speed will
not be faster than s · bmax/2bmax bps (bits per second). Hence, such a chaotic
encryption scheme only can be used in non-real-time applications, such as the
secure transmission of short messages over network or the secure storage of
small files in computers.
At last, let us discuss the key entropy of the improved scheme. When the finite
computing precision is L(bits), the control parameter and initial conditions
are represented as a fixed-point binary decimal. So the key entropy of the
improved scheme is 2L. In most computers L = 32 or 64, then the key entropy
is 64 or 128, which is enough as a secure cipher. If higher security is wanted,
larger L is suggested being used.
3.4 Compression after encryption
There is a notable problem in the chaotic cipher: the block size of ciphertext
is much (> 2 times) larger than the one of plaintext. Compressing ciphertext
can solve it. Since the ciphertext is not balanced, it can be consequently com-
pressed with lossless statistical encoding methods, such as Huffman coding al-
gorithm [17]. Firstly, divide the ciphertext into two bit streams: b1b2 · · · bi · · ·
and n1n2 · · ·ni · · ·. Then compress the two sub-streams with Huffman cod-
ing separately. For the stream n1n2 · · ·ni · · ·, the average size of compressed
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cipher-block will be bmax according to eq. (3). For the stream b1b2 · · · bi · · ·, the
average size of compressed cipher-block will be close to 1 since each bi in ci-
phertext trends to be bmax. Hence, the average size of compressed cipher-block
will be close to bmax+1, only 1 bit more than the maximal size of plain-block.
3.5 Experimental Results
Based on the chaotic map defined in eq. (1), we construct an experimen-
tal cryptosystem and test its cryptographic properties. Here the computing
precision is L = 32(bits), bmax = 8, and the perturbing PRNG is a maxi-
mal length LFSR (m-LFSR), whose degree is L and primitive polynomial is
1+x+x27+x28+x32. The perturbing interval ∆ is L (note gcd(L, 2L−1) = 1),
and all bits of the m-LFSR are used to perturb the chaotic orbit.
As we have mentioned above, the discrete distribution of ni is denoted by
eq. (3) theoretically. When the plaintext is distributed uniformly, the exper-
imental result coincides with the theoretical curve as shown in Fig. 1. When
the plaintext is 59 59 · · · 59 · · ·, the experimental result is shown in Fig. 2.
The number of encrypted plain-block is 50,000. When the secret keys (control
parameters and initial conditions) are selected as different values randomly,
similar results are obtained. So the confusion property is confirmed.
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Experimental Result
Theoretical Distribution
Fig. 1. The distribution of ni with uniformly distributed plaintext
Some other experiments are made to verify the diffusion property. The dif-
ference of ni in two ciphertexts is shown in Fig. 3–5, with the least different
plain-texts, control parameters and initial conditions, respectively. The differ-
ent parameters are listed as follows:
The least different plaintexts (see Fig. 3): 195 195 · · · 195 · · · and 196 195
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Fig. 2. The distribution of ni with fixed plaintext 59 59 · · · 59 · · ·
· · · 195 · · ·
The least different control parameters (see Fig. 4): p1 = 31849/2
32 and
p2 = 31848/2
32.
The least different initial conditions (see Fig. 5): x0,1 = 40332/2
32 and
x0,2 = 40333/2
32.
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Fig. 3. The difference of ni with two least different plaintexts
4 Conclusion
In this letter, we point out two essential defects existing in the chaotic en-
cryption scheme proposed in [1], and propose a new scheme to improve its
security by avoiding the two defects and solving other weaknesses. Our scheme
is immune to the four attacks presented in [2] and has desired cryptographic
properties.
10
50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
−10000
−8000
−6000
−4000
−2000
0
2000
4000
6000
i
Fig. 4. The difference of ni with two control parameters having 2−L difference
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Fig. 5. The difference of ni with two initial conditions having 2−L difference
Although the security of the original scheme can be improved, its encryption
speed cannot be essentially improved much because of the time-consuming
search procedure. Therefore, its encryption speed is still rather slower than
most conventional ciphers. It is a remained weakness in our improve scheme.
We will try to find the solution to this problem in the future, but perhaps any
possible solution will lead to entirely different chaotic cryptosystem from the
original one proposed in [1].
In addition, as we know, the public-key cryptosystem is generally used to
encrypt the secret keys of symmetric ciphers, which are used to encrypt the
plaintext transmitted via public channel. Apparently, they are not so sensitive
to the encryption speed. Another open research in the future is extending this
symmetric chaotic cipher to a public-key one.
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